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Abstract  
 
 
In this paper we try to present the main trends of evolution of the ICT sector. Its dynamics, 
supported by a constant technical progress in ICs, compounded with “non convexities” such 
as network effects and high sunk costs, may either lead to a Schumpeter Mark I or 
Schumpeter Mark II competition regime. This means that in some segments, the market will 
be more competitive (Mark I), while in other it will be more monopolistic (Mark II). But a 
key trend is also the so called “convergence”. But digitization makes it cost effective to 
integrate different communications, information processing and entertainment systems and 
devices. Hence, Schumpeter Mark II grows at the core where software production dominates, 
while Schumpeter Mark I is established at the periphery.  
 
In this context, the European ICT industry is potentially smashed between two forces: the cost 
advantages of Asian countries on one hand, the inventiveness and dynamism of the US 
industry on the other hand. The way out of this very difficult situation is to create in Europe 
the conditions of restoring knowledge accumulation in a key sub-sector of ICT, that is 
software production. To do this, Europe can rely on its tradition of cooperation and 
knowledge sharing and on a set of institutions that have shown their ability to stimulate inter-
regional cooperation. By concentrating on an ambitious project of open source software 
production in embarked systems and domestic networks, Europe could reach several 
objectives: to make freely accessible an essential facility, to stimulate competition, to help 
reaching the Lisbon objectives and to restore the European competitiveness in ICT. 
 
 
Keywords:  Information and communications technologies, industrial policy, competition 
regimes, knowledge based society, open source. 
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Has the European ICT sector a chance to be 
competitive? 
 
 G. Dang Nguyen & C. Genthon  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
To answer the question put in the title in around twenty five pages, should be considered as 
particularly temerarious, if not completely foolish. But it is worth the challenge because such 
an industry is both fascinating and illuminating, due to its huge degree of technical progress, 
its pervasiveness in our modern life, and its development potential which, more than fifty 
years after the birth of the transistor, seems as great as ever.  
We construct our attempt  in two parts: first we define what is the ICT sector (Section I).  We 
explore its main features, and show in particular that it is essential to distinguish its global 
evolution, from that of its single subsectors. This leads us in particular, to focus our analysis 
on the issue of convergence. In Section II, we present a tentative proposal for a European 
industrial policy, which could cope with the challenges to European firms raised by the ICT 
evolution. Starting from a diagnosis of the current European position in the ICT sector, we 
sketch the possible contour of a European industrial policy. 
 
Section I:  Evolution of the ICT sector  
 
A - Definitions and basic features 
 
Basically, the ICT sector includes the manufacturing and services activities which rely on the 
use of Integrated Circuits (ICs) and more generally electronic components, for the purpose of 
communications and information processing. This definition seems fairly reasonable but still 
raises borders issues. Is, for example, the medical instrument industry (scanners, IRM,  
radiography apparatus, etc.), which largely relies on ICs, part of the ICT sector? We can argue 
that its main purpose is information processing, but we can also say that the objective is to 
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cure patients, as much as the purpose of the motor vehicle (which by the way uses more and 
more electronic devices) is to transport persons or goods.2  
 
Seen from an “electronic perspective”, the ICT sector includes, in a broad sense, “assemblers” 
and  “integrators” which manufacture systems used by end users, or other manufacturers or 
service providers. To give an example, the German car equipment manufacturer Bosch, can 
also be considered as an “electronic integrator”, which relies heavily on ICs for its production. 
The pervasiveness of electronic components in general, suggests that there are many of these 
“electronic integrators and assemblers” in various areas of the economic activity (car and 
aircraft manufacturing, medical instruments, toys production, etc.). Another important point is 
that the share of microelectronics (in particular ICs) embedded in these devices and systems, 
raises constantly since the early 60s. This share was estimated globally at 5% in 1960, 10% in 
1980, 30% in 2003. This applies particularly to DVDs, flat screen displays, digital cameras, 
decoders where ICs can represents 50% of the equipment value.3 Another figure to keep in 
mind is that presently 6 billion of electronic devices are produced each year, with an average 
10% decrease in prices.4
 
The leverage effect of ICs and their pervasiveness in the economic activity, can also be 
understood with market figures: it is estimated that the world semiconductors market is worth 
200 billion $ and 3 million job places, the electronic devices (objects or systems) markets 
1000 billion $ and 18 million jobs, and the electronics related services 5000 billion $ and 100 
million jobs.5 The semiconductor industry thus influences directly or indirectly an economic 
activity which is 25 times larger. Hence, this leverage effect, cannot be neglected. 
 
The figures also suggest that a key element for the ICT sector’s definition rests upon the 
distinction between manufacturing and services. The official definition of ICT includes both, 
but may not take into account all the electronic systems we have mentioned. According to the 
European Commission and following a consensus adopted by OECD countries, the ICT 
manufacturing sector is defined as follows: office, accounting and computing machinery 
(NACE 30.01 and 30.02), insulated wire and cable (NACE 31.3), electronic valves and tubes 
and other electronic components (NACE 32.1), television, radio transmitters and apparatus for 
telephony and telegraphy (NACE 32.2), television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or producing apparatus and associated goods (NACE 32.3), instruments and 
appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes (NACE 33.2) 
industrial process equipment (NACE 33.3). In the ICT service sector instead, the Commission 
has put wholesale of electrical household appliances (NACE 51.43), wholesale of machinery, 
equipment and supplies (NACE 51.64), wholesale of other machinery used in industry, trade 
and navigation (NACE 51.65), telecommunications services (NACE 64.2) renting of office 
machinery and equipment including computers (NACE 71.33) computer and related activities 
                                                 
2  It is estimated that cars, which included 1700 $ of electronics per vehicle in 2001, will see this number raise to 
2700 $ by the year 2008. See Dominique Lemoine (2004) “Bilan Electronique 2003” Anvar, Paris, June. 
3  Ibid. 
4  JP Dauvin (2003), “Assises de la Filière Electronique et Numérique” French Senate, Paris, 11th June. 
5  Groupements Professionnels de la Filière Electronique et Numérique (2004) « Livre Bleu :  » 
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(NACE 72). In most cases we will limit ourselves to this OECD/EU definition, and also 
emphasize the role of electronic components.  
 
With the narrow definition of OECD, figures for the European ICT sector are provided in 
table 1. We can observe that the service sector represents roughly 80% of the total sector.  
Noticeable is also the leadership of the UK in ICT services, both in terms of number of firms, 
personal and turnover. However, this may be due to statistical definitions on which no 
precision is given in the original source. 
 
 
Table 1: European ICT sector (OECD definition) 
 
                               ICT Manufacturing  ICT Services  
  Value 
added  
EUR million 
Number of  
Persons 
employed   
Number of 
entreprises  
Turnover
EUR 
million  
Value added 
EUR 
million  
Number of  
Persons 
employed  
Number of 
enterprises 
Turnover  
EUR million  
EU25  88 720  1 771 106  63 608 398 258 358 564  4 989 106  618 638  1 232 842  
Belgium  1 904  25 875  540 6 560 11 445  145 370  15 896  50 467  
Czech Republic  740  65 697  4 625 3 697 684  43 031  18 220  1 965  
Denmark  1 174  21 662  596 3 279 7 816  116 235  10 435  28 470  
Germany  20 135  355 099  6 931 85 130 64 061  776 997  49 647  208 863  
Estonia  40  6 104  162 129 110  6 806  1 180  698  
Greece  n.a  n.a  n.a n.a n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  
Spain  3 484  66 177  3 115 14 390 24 727  406 810  41 885  87 518  
France  16 818  297 665  6 725 74 329 51 365  760 679  71 701  194 196  
Ireland  4 548  37 276  218 26 294 2 649  33 790  3 805  12 073  
Italy  8 655  179 453  14 910 29 759 40 596  586 034  106 297  128 417  
Cyprus  3  83  3 n.a 454  5 749  368  787  
Latvia  10  675  115 12 532  16 672  1 316  1 521  
Lithuania  110  10 575  194 307 396  19 588  1 613  1 453  
Luxembourg  64  1 347  15 147 1 254  9 960  1 782  5 638  
Hungary  1 080  74 626  4 014 7 954 2 232  74 560  20 411  7 597  
Malta  173  3 297  59 1 214 63  2 512  691  204  
Netherlands  1 398  66 178  1 135 4 853 16 622  343 849  29 105  100 959  
Austria  2 841  38 781  510 9 136 8 098  109 140  12 123  30 327  
Poland  1 479  75 405  6 852 5 184 2 911  n.a  25 275  7 603  
Portugal  743  21 494  486 3 867 4 567  76 935  7 310  15 954  
Slovenia  243  n.a  1 022 928 351  n.a  2 673  1 623  
Slovak Republic  184  24 428  310 840 731  31 801  1 896  2 375  
Finland  7 251  47 814  717 26 663 5 791  86 621  7 558  20 856  
Sweden  992  82 016  1 850 19 550 13 362  221 014  34 372  47 859  
United Kingdom  14 650  269 379  8 504 74 037 97 749  1 114 953  153 079  275 420  
 
Source: EUROSTAT, New Cronos 2003.  
 
Some key elements feature the economic evolution of this sector: 
 
 Very high and very predictable technological progress in ICs (Moore’s Law). This 
gives the opportunity both to newcomers to quickly enter the market, and to 
entrenched leaders to keep their competitive advantage nearly indefinitely. In the 
theory of innovation, the first situation is referred to as “Schumpeter Mark I” while the 
second is nicknamed “Schumpeter Mark II” (see for example Nelson and Winter, 
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1982, Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). Schumpeter Mark I is synonym of “innovation as 
creative destruction” while Schumpeter Mark II means “innovation as creative 
accumulation”. Whether the sector or some sub-sector of ICT industries evolves along 
the Mark I or the Mark II regime, is important to know, not the least for antitrust 
motives. This may be due to specific technicalities: for example designing DRAMs is 
less complex than designing a microprocessors because it is the simple repetition of a 
basic motive; thus entry should be easier in this sub-sector. But other factors on the 
demand side may also influence the innovation regime.  
 
  The service, and even more the manufacturing ICT sector, have been subject to 
fluctuations in their activity during the last years, and this will come back in the future. 
To give an illustrative figure, the telecommunications equipment market has dropped 
from 120 to 60 billion $ within two years between 2000 and 2002. These fluctuations 
are not specific to ICT and reflect the presence of high sunk costs (R&D, 
infrastructure, marketing and advertisement expenditures). They give advantages to 
large incumbents which have “deep pockets” to go through temporary financial 
difficulties. 
 
 The systemic nature of innovation; the latter, in order to be successful, may require the 
presence of complementary assets (Teece, 1986). For example, the failure of EMI, the 
inventor of the scanner, to be the market leader in the 70’s, is explained by the 
difficulty for this company to get access to decision makers in American hospitals and 
the Congress. This difficulty has allowed well entrenched competitors (in particular 
General Electric) to catch up and overcome EMI.  In that case, Schumpeter Mark II 
may prevail on Mark I: incumbents controlling key complementary assets can 
maintain their position even in front of innovative new entrants. Sometimes the 
complementary assets may be “non market”, involving institutional mechanisms and 
rules. In the case of EMI, GE initially lobbied the Congress to limit the use of scanners 
for safety reasons. Hence the evolution towards Schumpeter Mark I or Mark II may be 
conditioned by the interrelatedness between market and institutional evolutions.  
 
 The interplay, as in many “high tech” industries, between public and private research, 
that is “open” and “protected” knowledge creation: For the latter to be successful, one 
needs to publicly subsidize “open” research while enforcing “protection regimes”, 
because both are complementary (for further details, see D. Foray, 2002). This case is 
another example of relationships between market and non market mechanisms, albeit 
upwards from the competition process, in the research and innovation phase. An 
outstanding example of such interplay is provided by dual technologies, that is 
technologies which are developed for military purposes (and paid for by the defense 
budget of a government) and later extended to civil uses, endowing the subcontractors 
with a strong competitive advantage. Examples abound of such technologies: 
computer reservation systems, Internet, Teflon (in the material industry) are some of 
them. The USA are particularly strong at exploiting dual technologies. 
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 The key value of user/ producer interactions (Von Hippel, 1988), particularly in the 
early phases of the innovation process. This has led some authors in particular M. 
Porter (1990) to claim that one of the key factors for success is the proximity of 
manufacturers and users, namely a large home market. Dual technologies are an 
example of such interactions, but Internet and the evolution of computer science have 
strongly widened the scope of users promoted (or even created) innovations: the world 
wide web, Linux and LaTex, are well known examples of the users’ creativity. 
 
 The importance of networks effects, particularly but not only in the communications 
sector. These effects may boost innovation, as we can see with Internet diffusion. On 
the other hand, network effects may sometimes delay it by protecting an older 
technology, as can be seen from the non diffusion of  HDTV.6 This phenomenon is 
well known in the economics of standards literature (see for example Katz and 
Schapiro, 1985, and also Rohlfs, 2001) and may lead to a Schumpeter Mark II instead 
of Mark I regime. 
 
 Finally, in the manufacturing ICT sub-sector as a whole, the issue is raised whether 
production plants can be maintained in industrialized countries, in particular the 
European area. While this problem of foreign investment is not new, it has become a 
real issue with the quick development of India and China in the ICT related activities. 
To give some examples, ICT’s share of imports and exports represented respectively 
12.1% and 12.3 % of total manufacturing imports and exports of China in 1996. In 
2003 the figures were respectively 26.8% for imports and 28.1% for exports.7  China 
in 2003 represented 16% of the world production in electronic devices manufacturing, 
but this proportion may raise to 40% in 2010. For India, the share of exports accounted 
for by the computer service sector only, represented 20% of India’s exports in 2003.8 
This means that not only production but also research centers may be moved to Asia 
and Pacific area. This obviously has major consequences on the future of the European 
ICT sector. 
 
Thus, the competitive process will be difficult to understand, because it is highly dynamic and 
some form of monopoly or oligopoly could emerge, due to network effects and the systemic 
nature of innovations. For example with Internet and the instant worldwide diffusion of 
information related services, network effects combined with sunk costs and user/ producer 
interactions, trigger a “winner takes all” effect, which, in the recent past, has benefited to 
companies such as e-Bay, Amazon or Google and Microsoft as well. Hence the global 
evolution of ICT may either promote Schumpeter Mark I or Mark II innovation regimes. 
Moreover a market equilibrium, whenever it exists, may be completely unfavorable to 
European firms or manpower. The question of the validity of a European policy in this sector 
                                                 
6  For a full and illuminating discussion of network effects, see Rohlfs (2001). A more theoretical perspective is 
provided by O. Shy (2001). 
7  See M Katsuno (2005) 
8  See S. Dutta (2004) 
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may thus be raised. Finally, each segment of the large ICT sector may experience, on its own, 
a specific evolution related to some of the ICT features listed above. 
 
B- Competition regimes and dominant segments 
 
Actually, each of the sub-sectors (computer and software manufacturing, communications 
equipment manufacturing and services, media equipment manufacturing, content production) 
may be subject to what one of us calls a competition regime (Genthon, 2002). This makes the 
analysis even more difficult. Let’s look quickly at these specificities. 
 
 With predictable technical progress (Moore’s Law), the ICs industry has had, with the 
notable exception of microprocessors market segment, a competition regime which 
has evolved from a Schumpeter Mark I type of competition, towards Schumpeter 
Mark II. This stems from the fact that each generation of ICs requires the building up 
of new factories, and that the investments become higher and higher (two to three 
billions dollars a plant, one billion of R&D costs for each generation of 
semiconductor). There is thus, among the manufacturers, a consensus about the so 
called “ITRS Roadmap”.9 Innovation becomes common knowledge and the very 
source of competitive advantage no longer relies in a better understanding of future 
technological developments, but in the degree of risk that each manufacturer is ready 
to take, in which product it specializes, and to which privileged market it has access. 
In synthesis, the ICs industry becomes more and more a “cartelized” sector, where 
innovation, still the engine of growth for this activity, is monitored by a “club” of 
manufacturers which controls the development pace. This does not prevent price and 
production cycles, particularly in the DRAM segment, but at least reduces their 
amplitude.  
 
 
Table 2: The ITRS “Road Map” for the next 15 years 
 
First year of 
production 
2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2018 
Minimal dimension 
DRAM (10-9 m) 
Microprocessor(10-9 
m) 
 
90 
37 
 
65 
26 
 
45 
18 
 
32 
13 
 
22 
9 
 
22 
7 
Alimentation (Volt) 0.9/1,2 0.8/1.1 0.7/1 0.6/0.9 0.6/0.85 0.5/0.7 
Frequency (GHz) 4.1 9.2 15 22.9 39.6 53.2 
Source: Lemoine (2004) 
 
 The computer manufacturing industry has benefited from the downsizing of hardware, 
which now provides in a PC and to hundred of millions of single users, a computing 
                                                 
9  ITRS is an international consortium of major players in ICs which conducts a collective thinking about future 
technologies and production methods. 
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and storing power unbelievable for “mainframes” in the early 90s. The industry is now 
featured by vertical disintegration (Groves, 1997) and the so called “Wintel” 
paradigm: Windows operating system and Intel’s microprocessors feature most of 
PC’s  worldwide.10 Such domination is a consequence of a network effect which gives 
to an old technology a decisive advantage against any innovative newcomer (a 
Schumpeter Mark II regime). In the core business of Microsoft, namely the operating 
system, there hardly has been any challenger so far: Unix, once supported by AT&T, 
Sun, or even Digital Equipment did not live to the expectations. The only challenger 
having emerged in the recent past, is the users promoted Linux, which, by definition, 
does not belong to any manufacturing company. To some extent, competition to 
Windows is thus “virtual”. In the hardware segment, after the success of Dell relying 
on e-commerce, the market is stabilizing around a bunch of “Wintel” subcontractors. 
The withdrawal of IBM and the emergence of Chinese manufacturers is the revelation 
that industry becomes a “commodity” industry where PCs are produced at low cost in 
China or Far East Asia. Distributors will thus establish commercial relationships with 
these low cost manufacturers similarly to major textile or clothing firms, which get 
their products from the same producing areas. 
 
 The software industry is again dominated by Microsoft in the domain of personal 
productivity applications (Office “suites”), while there is a bit more of competition for 
company specific software, in particular ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning). Here 
the market is split between the leader SAP and its main challenger, Oracle/ Peoplesoft. 
The same applies even more for e-commerce software, where there is no clear market 
leader, even not IBM. Generally speaking, the software industry is featured by high 
sunk costs (both of R&D and marketing) and low production costs. This leads to a  
small number of competitors, which have a capacity to innovate and market new 
products with high distribution and advertisement budgets. Therefore, a company like 
Microsoft, which holds a lot of cash (around 40 billion $) may be in position to sustain 
“wars of attrition” against competitors, provided its product development quality is not 
far below theirs. This attitude has been exemplified recently in several market 
segments such as browsers, or media interfaces for the Internet. Here again, 
Schumpeter Mark II  has a strong probability to prevail, particularly because, on the 
demand side, network effects rely on “ascending compatibility”: the strength of the 
“installed based” gives an advantage to the market leader: Thus, monitoring a regular 
software renewal by end users, secures in the long run, revenues to this leader.  
 
 The communications services sector has been featured by competition since the 
deregulation established in the mid 80’s in the US, Japan and the UK, and at the end of 
the 90s in Europe and in most parts of the world. Competition is tightly controlled by 
regulation authorities, since the previous monopolies still hold a dominant position in 
their market: The bulk of the infrastructure is their property, and access to it is an 
                                                 
10  Intel has a challenger, AMD, but still remains the market leader, while the market share of Apple is no more 
than 3%. 
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“essential facility” for their competitors. Moreover, in mobile telephony competition is 
limited by the scarcity of radio frequencies and the large amount of investments that 
operators have to bear in order to install equipment.11 Therefore, the operators have 
strong incentives to extract consumer surplus from mature technologies (such as GSM 
in Europe) before launching next generation systems. In the more traditional fixed 
network communications, telephony is today threatened by the emergence of Voice on 
IP (VoIP), potentially making their infrastructure (the switching equipment) and their 
tariff policy (time dependent tariffs) completely obsolete. Since fixed telephony still 
represents 45% of operators revenues,12 the long term position of traditional operators 
may be really endangered and their size reduced, with further concentrations likely to 
occur in the short-medium term. In front of this very strong threat, “historical” 
operators may be tempted to abuse of their (still) dominant position; hence regulation 
is  the key to the sector evolution. 
 
 The dynamics of the competition regime triggered by IP technology will lead to 
integration between access providers and infrastructure owners in the Internet world. 
In fact, the weakness of the sector has been revealed during the burst of the financial 
bubble: it has been originated by the absence of coordination between ISP (Internet 
Service Providers) and backbone operators. The latter invested heavily in fiber 
networks, while the access providers could not deliver services accordingly, because at 
the same time they were caught in price wars and had no access to the technology 
(ADSL) which would have made the most of large transport facilities. As a result, 
many companies went bankrupt.13 However, with the likely decrease of fixed 
telephony due to VoIP, one can expect that even a successful company with little 
infrastructure like Tele 2, will invest heavily in capacity. In any case, 
telecommunications operators are presently prevented from evolving to a Schumpeter 
Mark II regime or at least to a “cartel” regime, thanks to the action of the regulators; 
otherwise all other factors would push in that direction. 
 
 In the telecommunications and network equipment manufacturing sector, the burst of 
the bubble as well as the diffusion of mobiles and IP related technologies, have had a 
tremendous impact. In the pre-internet era, the bulk of competitive advantage was an 
ability to transfer the advances in ICs and computing power into capabilities of an 
equipment specifically designed for the telecommunications carriers needs. But the 
sudden diffusion of IP related technologies has overwhelmed this situation. No longer 
good connections with operators are the key to a competitive advantage. Instead, it is 
an ability to sell a quickly evolving equipment (the so called routers and fiber optics) 
to a host of rapidly expanding new entrants. Telecommunications manufacturers 
proved to be particularly slow to react to these new market conditions, and 
newcomers, in particular Cisco and to much lesser extent Newbridge, took the lead. 
                                                 
11  Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) which  have appeared recently,  may be an alternative source for 
competition. 
12  This figure is taken from the French market estimates. 
13  The only successful exception to this vertical integration scheme in Europe is Tele 2. 
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The traditional telecommunications equipment manufacturers (Alcatel, Ericsson, NT, 
Lucent or Siemens) had to rely on the mobile market to maintain their profits, but they 
had to struggle there with aggressive outsiders such as Nokia, Motorola, Samsung. 
These companies have invested earlier and in a more consistent way in this promising 
new business. As a result, we can say that the equipment manufacturing industry 
sector has evolved towards a Schumpeter Mark I, that is a more competitive regime. 
 
 Internet applications have blossomed during the “Internet bubble” and some of them 
have survived the bubble burst. Some e-commerce applications such as online booking 
of transport tickets, or buying PCs on the Net, or second hand objects auctions, have 
really been successful. But the bulk of applications (80%) comes from the market of 
business to business (Bto B) relationships. Although the B to B “electronic 
marketplaces” such as Covisint or Freemarkets have not been profitable, many 
business to business relationships which preexisted to the Internet diffusion, have been 
eased and their cost reduced through the use of Net. The latter is only part of 
“corporate digitization”, geared towards an efficient customer response. The diffusion 
of Internet applications in the business sector does not provide major upheaval in the 
software industry. The point is that business are heterogeneous and therefore local 
(geographical) factors as well as a good knowledge of and connection with the 
customer’s business are part of the competitive advantage, and create local barriers to 
entry. Other characteristics of the software industry including sunk cost, are on the 
other hand still valid. It is thus no surprise to observe a concentration movement in 
this industry, which enables the companies to preserve their competitive advantages 
linked to the demand side (specificities provided by local or customer’s business 
elements), while not losing ground on the supply factors (sunk costs). 
 
The impression that results from this sketchy description of ICT sectors’ competition regimes, 
is rather mixed.  There are common trends (e.g. technical progress in ICs, increased 
connectivity hence increased network effects) but each sub-sector seems to require a specific 
analysis. Some evolve towards a Schumpeter Mark I (consumer electronics, telecom-
munications and computer manufacturing) while other move towards a strong (operating 
systems, application software) or a weak (telecommunications services, ICs) Schumpeter 
Mark II regime. It would be erroneous however, to assume that these evolutions are 
independent. 
 
C- Dominant designs and convergence 
 
We have now communications capabilities in cars, computers, and possibly TV sets. We can 
retrieve information from the Internet with the help of a computer, a mobile telephone, a TV 
set, a digital assistant. We can look at films on TV or computer screens, in a car on a 
videogame station. Technology seems to bring convergence in usage of devices embedding 
similar electronic circuitry. New concepts have appeared such as “always best connected”, 
“spontaneous networks”, “pervasive computing”. New commercial offers have reached the 
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market, such as “triple play” (Internet + telephony + television programmes). We can thus 
speak of a genuine technological convergence as well as a convergence in usage (Rallet, 
1996). But the impact of those broad trends on the evolution of firms and markets is far from 
clear. 
 
As Greenstein and Khanna (1998) have put it, convergence may occur “in substitutes” or “in 
complements”. In the first case, the devices substitute each other in accomplishing the same 
task, as is the case when seeing a film either on a TV or a computer screen. Competition may 
thus be enlarged to a wider market : we may move towards Schumpeter Mark I. In the second 
case, the devices complement each other to provide better or new usage opportunities. Internet 
for example has been the outcome of complementarities between computers and 
telecommunications networks. However these complementarities may lead to Schumpeter 
Mark II, because incumbents rely on their complementary assets to implement the innovations 
stemming from the convergence and therefore increase their market power.14 But they may 
also lead to Schumpeter Mark I, because new entrants holding complementary assets, bite into 
the market shares of incumbents with new products, as shown with cable TV firms becoming 
telecommunications operators.  
 
Greenstein and Khanna moreover emphasize the point that some complementarities at the 
manufacturing level may lead to substituability at the usage level. For example 
interconnecting the mobile and fixed networks has made it possible to provide new services to 
the consumer and help complementarities. But now some customers react by substituting the 
fixed telephone with a mobile one. This interplay between substituability and 
complementarities makes it difficult to predict how competition regimes may evolve. Also, 
the transition from one competition regime to a completely new one may thus be influenced 
by a form of institutional convergence within the ICT sector: if for example, media regulation 
is carried out in the same fashion as telecommunications regulation, the rules of the game 
might influence the media/ computer convergence.  
 
To go beyond those broad statements about convergence, we have to stress that there are 
some asymmetries in the evolution of the ICT sub-sectors. Some of them have had or will 
have a dominant influence on the evolution of the sector as a whole,15 because they have 
grown or are growing more quickly than others. The opportunities provided by networking 
and complementarities set up a channel through which this influence is exerted. We call these 
sub-sectors dominant segments. Let’s review them briefly. 
 
The PC has been in the 80’s the leading ICT product sold all around the world and has clearly 
been established as a dominant segment. Its diffusion has conditioned the evolution of the 
whole ICT sector, up to the mid 90’s. New applications and usages have appeared such as 
word-processors and spreadsheets, file transfers and workflows, local area networks, Internet 
                                                 
14  This is more or less what Microsoft achieved with browsers 
15  We leave aside the ICs  the influence of which has always been there, but in rather predictable terms (see 
above) 
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(that is, a very wide area network). All of them have enabled information retrieval16 and 
written communication, through the use of PC. The latter has provided complementarities 
with telecommunications services, testified by the worldwide success of Internet. Nowadays, 
however, the PC market seems, technologically speaking, to have reached a maturity stage, 
although it is still expanding in terms of market penetration. Its influence upon the whole ICT 
sector is thus declining.  
 
In the mid 90’s mobile telephony  took the lead, and for a time played the role of a dominant 
segment, at least in Europe. The evolution of digital systems towards “2.5G” (Edge, GPRS) 
and 3G (UMTS) provides new opportunities for market and usage expansion, while at the 
same time giving an impulsion to convergence with Internet. Hence the product and its 
derivatives will create new opportunities for usage.17 Will it still be a dominant segment in 
the next years? There are, at least, technological opportunities to enhance the capabilities of 
mobile telephones, which become internet terminals, cameras, portable computers. A by-
product of this may be “pervasive computing”, that is systems which enable people wearing 
electronic devices to be able, at any moment, to communicate, retrieve information, conduct 
transactions and more generally interact with the “electronic environment” they go through. 
The features of this “pervasive computing” are still to be established. But it might become a 
dominant design. 
 
Since the beginning of this millennium, consumer electronics  have experienced a revival and 
offers new opportunities both for convergence and for new usages.  The success of videogame 
stations, digital cameras, home video and now terrestrial digital television, provides a 
technological environment (“domestic networking”) for home based ICT products in the 
context of leisure. It creates opportunities for complementarities and substituability with 
computers and networks. It also creates opportunities for manufacturing devices in low wage 
countries and broadens the scope for competition. Thus, Schumpeter Mark I competition 
regime may feature this evolution. On the other hand, Schumpeter Mark II may also emerge 
because of the provision of connectivity to all these electronic devices. In fact, one does not 
know yet how the “home area network” will work. When this happens, Schumpeter Mark I or 
Schumpeter Mark II competition regimes may both be favored.  
 
On the whole, ICT has been experiencing at least three or four important life cycles since 
1980, each of them having brought, or is bringing during its initial phase, a more competitive 
regime. In the near future, there may be two candidates for being the future dominant 
segment, home systems associated with the development of consumer electronics and 
pervasive computing linked with the diffusion of mobile technology. The following table 
gives an historical picture summarizing the linkages provided by networking within the ICT 
sector: 
                                                 
16  It is important to note that the attempts to bypass the PC in providing connectivity have failed. This was the 
gamble of Network PC promoted in the mid 90’s to avoid Microsoft’s licences. 
17  There are also alternative technological opportunities, such as “Wimax”. 
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Table 3 : Linkages in the ICT industry 
 
 System Centric 
(1964-81) 
PC Centric 
(1981-94) 
Network Centric 
(1994-2005) 
Content Centric 
(2005 -?) 
Main users Business Professional Consumer Individual 
Technology ICs Microprocessor Bandwidth 
management 
Embedded Software 
“Laws”18 Grosch Moore Metcalfe  
Network focus Data center LANs “Best effort” “seamless 
interconnection” 
Supplier structure Vertical integration Horizontal 
integration 
Competition and 
cooperation 
Vertical and 
horizontal 
cooperation and 
competition 
Supplier leadership US systems US components Carriers and access 
providers 
Content providers 
Source: adapted from Low(2000) 
 
 
To go beyond this mere description let’s go back to the features of ICT. The shift in demand 
conditions is, to some extent, grounded on two basic features. Network effects and 
technological convergence, leading to system complementarities:  
 
 Technologically, complementarities are obvious, since they rely on digitization. The 
latter is the basis for technological convergence among many devices: computers, 
telephones, TV, etc.  
 From an usage point of view, the complementarities have been established with the 
advent and subsequent evolution of the Internet. The latter has provided and still 
provides an interoperability platform for any exchange of information. Hence,  a very 
strong network effect has been unraveled through Internet.  
 
The dynamics of ICT evolution thus offers, both at the manufacturing and at the usage levels, 
real complementarities between the system components. For example, you cannot retrieve 
information from Internet on your digital assistant if you have not a physical connection to a 
wireless network (through Bluetooth, Wifi, Wimax or whatever standard is used). You cannot 
download a film on your computer if the server has no access to the digital database of a 
content providing firm (or peer!). In this context, systems integration is particularly strong at 
the core (networks, servers) where interoperability is the key word.  
 
Complementarities shape the evolution of ICT but do not preclude substitutability as we have 
seen. The latter is possible in particular at the periphery, in the terminals and for some 
services (telephony and VoIP are a good example, but also communicating digital assistants 
                                                 
18  Two words are necessary about the “laws” stated in this table. Robert Grosch stated that the computer power 
increases as the square of its cost. Moore’s Law has already been mentioned claiming that the ICs 
performance doubles every two years. Metcalfe’s law establishes that the value of a network increases with 
the square of its connections. We could add to these “laws” that the size of information stored in digital form, 
which probably doubles every two years. 
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and portable PCs). Now, if consumer electronics becomes the next dominant segment, 
innovation will be featured by proprietary systems, hence substitutability with existing 
devices and more competition. Schumpeter Mark I will be part of the competition regime at 
this level.  
 
The same applies, to some extent, to pervasive computing. Embarked systems require specific 
and well conceived hardware and software, because of the technical constraints on energy 
provision, weight and robustness. The recent success of the digital assistant Blackberry shows 
how an innovative small company can take part to the competition game. Several operating 
systems for embarked systems have been put on the market, such as Windows CE, Symbian, 
Palm OS, etc. This is a stimulus for innovation and competition, at least since no one has 
overwhelmed the others. 
 
The consequence is that systems effects at the core interact with higher competition regimes 
at the periphery. This integration is provided partly by IP protocols, but the more 
heterogeneous the services and the terminals, the more strain will be put on standard and 
protocols definition. 
 
In this subtle dialectics between competition at the periphery and interconnection at the core, 
the systems approach may lead us to recognize that some specific component of the system is 
particularly important for the evolution as a whole. Focusing on the control of this component 
might be enough to master many single value chains of the ICT sub-sectors. After all, it is 
thanks to its control of the PC’s operating system that Microsoft has been able to later be the 
key player in the production of generic software (office “suites”) as well as the conception of 
Internet browsers. The point is that networking creates a need for a system anyway, while 
software (in particular operating systems) provides the “glue” which holds the system 
together.  
 
In the case of “home systems” and consumer electronics, the network operating system may 
be the candidate for being the key component. Manufacturers have recognized that, while 
working on the so called UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) protocols. But there is not yet a  
dominant design in the definition of home operating system. In the case of pervasive 
computing on the other hand, the discussion sketched above on alternative embarked 
operating systems,  shows that this component is also the keystone for embarked systems. 
 
Equipped with these elements for understanding the evolution of the ICT sector, we can now 
open the discussion about a European ICT policy. 
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Section II: Designing a European ICT policy 
 
Confronted with the complex ICT landscape presented in the foregoing section, the question 
may be raised whether designing a European policy makes sense. We should first examine if 
the European situation requires such a policy (§1), and after giving a positive answer, we will 
try to sketch its possible contour (§2). 
A - The European situation 
 
The European situation in the ICT sector is not particularly brilliant  in the ICT sector, neither 
is it catastrophic. Regional production and market statistics provide a mixed picture. First, we 
will consider the electronics sector, namely the manufacturing side of ICT, plus other 
electronic systems (for car, aircraft and so on).  
 
Table 4: Production in electronics sub-sectors 
 
 
 
There are several distinct sectors which use ICs and their evolution perspectives are quite 
similar. Consumer electronics, telecommunications and electronics (the three manufacturing 
sectors included in the OECD definition of ICT) represent 2/3 of total electronic devices 
manufacturing, and this proportion could decrease to 60% by 2007, to the benefit of avionics 
or automotive sectors. However, the recent explosion of consumer electronics markets and the 
difficulties of car producers with electronics may lead to a slight revision of this forecast. 
  
In any case, because of the significant proportion of “non ICT” electronic devices in 
manufacturing, Europe is roughly at the level of North America both in terms of size and 
growth, as table 5 shows. In particular, growth of electronics manufacturing should be higher 
in the Old than in the New Continent. Such “good news” for Europe can be explained. In 
automotive industry and avionics, European firms are competing on a par basis with their 
American counterpart. And to do this, they embed more and more electronics into their 
products, which leads them to interact strongly with their suppliers. This user/ producer 
interaction is one of the key elements for competitiveness, as many authors, Porter (1990) 
among others, have shown.19  
                                                 
19  But the most striking feature of table 5 is the extraordinary growth of China which should outperform Europe 
in market size in 2007 and North America in 2008.   
 16
G. Dang Nguyen & C. Genthon «  Has the European ICT sector a chance to be competitive?” 
 
 
Table 5: Production of the electronics sector by region 
 
 
 
In terms of market size (table 6), North America still remains the dominant market, and this 
means that its trade balance should be highly negative over the period. The European market, 
although growing quickly, will not catch up with North America before 2010, while the 
Chinese market could be comparable to both at that time. On the whole, the consensus is to 
expect that China will, by the end of the present decade, be the major player in the electronics 
manufacturing sector defined in a broad sense. Europe, left behind by the big Asian country, 
will not be at a handicap compared to the US and Japan. 
 
 
Table 6: Market for the electronic sector by region 
 
 
 
Table 5 however, which focuses on the manufacturing sector only, and broadens ICT 
definition to avionics and automotive sectors where Europe holds strong positions, might be 
somewhat misleading. We have to look at the service side, which is by far bigger than the 
manufacturing side (roughly four times). Here the European position is gloomier .  
 
Nowadays, the use of ICT is considered as a part of a global strategy aimed at promoting new 
growth paths summarized by the concept of “Knowledge based Society”. The latter is 
supposed to rely on four pillars: institutional evolution (the removal of obstacles to the 
development of markets and a stable and “healthy” macroeconomic framework), innovation, 
the use of ICT and the education of manpower. Basically, this concept of “Knowledge based 
society” has been put forward and largely discussed within OECD.  
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Picture 1: Investment in Knowledge by OECD Countries 
 
 
        Source OECD Factbook 2005. 
 
The European Union has also endorsed this target. The way towards the “Knowledge Based 
Society” is the very objective of the Lisbon agenda and ICT plays a key role in that respect. 
Consequently, the EU has launched the “eEurope” Program, with the object of stimulating the 
usage of ICT within the Union.  
 
But ICT usage does not suffice to achieve the objectives of the “Lisbon Agenda”. Picture 1 
presents a synthetic indicator of  “investment in knowledge”,20 often considered as necessary 
for the “Knowledge based society”. This indicator is defined as the sum of expenditure on 
R&D, higher education (public and private) and software. The picture shows that the North 
American effort is matched by only a couple of European countries, typically Sweden and 
Finland as well as an Asian country, Korea. Most European countries in particular Germany, 
France and the UK, have an “effort” which is 30% lower than the American one. With respect 
to the OECD’s definition of “investment in knowledge” Europe spends only 4% of its GDP 
on such an investment, while the proportion is 7% in the US. 
      
Even more of concern is the evolution of these expenses. For the sole R&D, the following 
table shows how unsatisfactory is the European evolution. 
 
                                                 
20 This includes expenses in R&D, software and higher education (University level). 
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Table 7: R&D expenses evolution 
 
R&D expenses 1995 1998 2001 
Europe (15) 124 143 175 
Europe/US 88% 71% 56% 
Europe/Japon 114% 138% 122% 
Billions euros.         Source : OCDE 
 
The situation is worse when we look at R&D expenditures in the individual sectors. 
According to OECD, the volume of these expenditures of US private firms was in 1999 0.7 
billion $ more than European ones in the pharmaceutical sector, 3.6 billion less in the 
automobile sector, 1.1 billion less in the chemical sector, but in excess of 7.3 billion $ in 
aerospace and, above all, of 28.7 billion $ in the ICT sector.21 Clearly, while Europe meets 
the R&D challenges in most high tech sectors, it does not succeed in ICT. Several factors 
explain this situation:  
 
- Economic factors: unfavorable macroeconomic conditions, but also network effects 
whereby leaders now are likely to become leaders in the future. Then it becomes 
useless for a country to support its home industry if it has no chance to catch up. 
 
- Institutional factors: these are the absence of structural reforms, leading to rigidities, 
the difficulty of implementing systemic innovations due to the fragmentation of the 
European efforts, cultural factors, which, in some sense, are a form of long term 
institutional specificity. 
 
- Sectoral factors: Europe does not lag behind in all sub-sectors.  We have several times 
emphasized the success of GSM, but the same does not apply to most of ICT products 
and services. In fact mobile telephony seems to be the only market segment where 
European firms, both in manufacturing and services, are world number one (Nokia for 
terminal manufacturing, Vodafone for mobile services). But it is well known that 
Asian manufacturers whether Korean (LG Electronics, Samsung), Japanese 
(Mitsubishi, Sharp) or even Chinese are catching up very quickly, at least in the 
terminals segment. 
 
The following table shows, however, that the effort on R&D has not worsened in all European 
countries. Two things are remarkable. First, the countries which have had their public 
expenditures in R&D raising quickly, are those which are “catching up” to achieve 
technological capabilities similar to the most advanced countries (Korea, Finland, Spain). The 
second thing is that the USA is the only technological leader which increases the level of  its 
public expenditures in proportion with the “catching up” countries.  
 
                                                 
21  See « Livre Bleu » (2004).  
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Table 8: Evolution of the public expenditures in R&D 
in the ICT sector (100 in 1997) 
 
Country Index in 2003 
Korea 233 
Finland 185 
USA 169 
Spain 164 
Italy 102 
Germany 99 
France 94 
Netherlands 91 
Source: CSTI on OECD data 
 
This means that there is a real challenge for Europe: An “effort” is possible, since it is 
accomplished by both “leaders” and “followers”. But will Europe be able to reduce the gap 
with the technological leader? Will it be in the position to resist the overwhelming 
development of the Asian ICT sector? 
 
B - An industrial policy for Europe 
 
Because Europe’s position in ICT is not so good as one would wish, it is natural to think of a 
kind of “industrial policy”. The concept however is debatable and has indeed been strongly 
debated.22  An industrial policy is  not very popular at the EU’s level, for several reasons: 
 
 First, this has been ignored by the “Founding Fathers” of the EU and therefore it is 
not in the Commission’s tradition. However it has been endorsed in the recent 
Maastricht Treaty, but there may be a question of definition: what is exactly an 
industrial policy and at what should it aim:  to create new jobs in Europe, to 
preserve job in Europe, to enhance European wealth or welfare…?  
 
 Second, there has always been a divergence among European countries about the 
definition of such a policy. To take two countries generally considered as close one 
to the other on European issues: France’s governments were not ashamed in the 
past  to use the State’s power to help (French) private firms in well targeted 
sectors. German governments instead, prefer to speak about “Strukturpolitik”, 
namely policies designed to support any type of industries or firms. This help is 
furthermore often mandated to “Länder”, that is, regional authorities. Divergence 
of interpretations could make it difficult to reach a consensus on these issues. 
 
 Third, the evolution of international trade and the globalization of companies 
makes the objective of such a policy less and less obvious: Does it make sense in 
                                                 
22  For a clear and comprehensive overview of industrial policy in the European context, see Pelkmans (2002) 
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that case to help national firms or firms established on the nation’s territory to  
achieve competitiveness worldwide?  
 
In the case of ICT, the urgency of public intervention at the European level is nowadays 
acknowledged. Focusing on an increase in the use of IT, “eEurope” promoters claim to 
indirectly boost the ICT manufacturing and service sectors. The same applies for the EU’s 
IST program which, within the 5th and 6th Research Framework Program, has been more 
concerned with an impact on the supply side. But if there is a consensus on the necessity for 
an intervention, what is the purpose, what are the instruments?  
 
C - The contour of a European industrial policy. 
 
Let’s start from the evolution of ICT. The discussion of Section II suggests that a European 
industrial policy may have at least two options: a systems approach, similar to what has been 
done with GSM, or a key component approach, targeting a key element of ICT sub-sectors. 
 
The former, however,  is complex, difficult to implement in a community of 25 states, full of 
technological difficulties to solve, whilst uncertain in its perspectives. For example, if we 
compare two examples of a systems approach, GSM and UMTS, we find very different 
results. In the first case it took eight years (from 1984 to 1992) to conceive the system, in a 
period when promoters of the GSM did not face competition and mastered their agenda. In the 
case of UMTS, the design period has been reduced to five years in a  very competitive 
environment and, as a consequence, the market introduction, imposed by a European 
Directive, has been too hasty. The end result is that ten years after the start of its conception, 
the UMTS still seems a gamble to most players involved in this business, because meanwhile 
technology has drastically evolved. The lesson is that it is not  easy nowadays to define, from 
the outset, a system that will encounter a large success,  that is technologically flexible and 
that will improve the European manufacturing and service industries altogether. Moreover, 
interconnection becomes the rule in the IP world and designing an autonomous system which 
could be unfolded in the same way as GSM has been, seems less and less feasible. 
 
Admittedly, the consumer electronics and media content distribution may be the germ of a 
future “home based system”. But it is not yet clear which shape such system will have. In 
particular, one does not know whether it will rely on proprietary systems. At the moment, 
most of domestic IT systems, having been designed by terminal equipment manufacturers, are 
proprietary. This explains in part why these systems have not yet really taken off. It might be 
the case that open, ie IP based, protocols will also be established for this market segment. 
There is the above mentioned example of UPnP already underway, which despite being 
promoted by Microsoft, gathers 300 of players including Sony or Intel. But as already said, at 
the moment the applications using this protocol have not yet been designed.  
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Concentrating on a key component on the other hand, leads us in the present context to focus 
on software development, in particular in the area of operating systems: as said before, it is 
the “glue” which holds the system together.  
 
While the markets have shifted away from PCs to mobile terminals and now to consumer 
electronics and pervasive computing, networking and interoperability are threading together 
these evolutions: demand for computers, mobile telephones, Internet access, digital TV, photo 
cameras, game stations will share opportunities of interconnection; pervasive computing 
means that embarked terminal will interact with their digital environment, everywhere and 
every time. This convergence will be guaranteed by at least two things: 
 
 Interface standards and common exchange protocols 
 Compatible operating systems. 
 
In the present context, US firms or institutions dominate the evolution of these features: a 
private firm, Microsoft, masters or tries to master the whole chain of operating systems in 
PCs, mobile terminals, game stations (Xbox), Internet access (MSN, Explorer). Similarly, US 
dominated standardization institutions like Internet’s IAB (Internet Advisory Board) and 
IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) or Icann establish interface standards, common 
exchange protocols, or control access to scarce resources (domain names). Of course, there 
are differences between a private company, which owns proprietary standards, and Internet 
Protocols designed by IETF and IAB, which are open. But the overwhelming presence of US 
based institutions simply reflects the greater competitiveness of the US firms in many 
software and hardware components, as well as the activity of US public institutions in 
standardization fora.23 This competitiveness is further increased by network effects and by the 
systemic nature of innovations, which are gradually embedded in existing complex systems 
and lead to “Schumpeter Mark II” innovation regimes. US institutions also help to strengthen 
US firms position by enforcing a very strong intellectual property rights regime, which 
preserves the interests of  incumbents and leaders. 
 
Hence, to design a European policy that could reverse this trend does not seem very easy. It 
appears that given the present weaknesses of European firms both in terms of costs (vis-à-vis 
Asian firms) and inventiveness and system control (vis-à-vis US firms), Europe has no way to 
choose an original path. But the European continent has a few trumps upon its sleeves. Those 
are well known and have been identified by the European institutions when the “Lisbon 
Agenda”  was set up at the beginning of this millennium:24
 
- Market size: after all it is a market of 455 million individuals, reasonably wealthy. 
This means that there is a potential for innovators to find customers locally and 
therefore to be helped in the design of their products by quick payback. 
                                                 
23  A exemplary demonstration has been the attitude adopted by the US government during the Tunis World 
Summit on Information Society in December 2005 denying any supranational access to Internet control. 
24  See Dang Nguyen & Jolles (2005). 
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- Collaboration between European firms and labs. There is a long tradition of such 
collaboration in many European countries. In Germany the Fraunhofer Institutes, in 
France the CEA (Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique) or Inria, in Italy the ENEA, in 
the Netherlands the TNO, and even at the European level the ECRC, are examples of 
public research centers which have long developed a tradition of cooperation with 
firms. While this is not exceptional when compared to the US and Japan, it means that 
public institutions can help in the process of knowledge accumulation and innovation. 
 
- Education of manpower. To give an example: there were in 1999 in Sweden, 1.2 per 
thousand inhabitants between 25 and 34 holding a PhD in science and technology, 1.0 
per thousand in Finland, 0.8 in Germany, 0.7 in France, against 0.45 in the US and 
0.25 in Japan.25 
 
- Cultural tradition of knowledge distribution and sharing, mostly locally. Take for 
example, the well known Linux operating system, a leader of open source software.  
There has been 1.74 contributor per million inhabitants in Finland, 1.13 for the 
Netherlands, 1.12 for Danemark and 0.48 for the US. All in all, 146 contributors went 
from Europe, against 132 from the USA.26 
 
These trumps are not decisive however, since for most of them Europe remains superseded by 
the US. But in order for Europe to overcome its position of challenger, we suggest to thread 
these elements together and relate them to the open versus proprietary knowledge debate:27 if 
Europe lets knowledge be “open”, this encourages its dissemination. People having, by 
education or self apprenticeship, the capacity to assimilate this knowledge will be better off, 
and may even increase this “stock” of knowledge if they are inclined to do so. On the other 
hand, if knowledge is proprietary, people will have strong private incentives to accumulate 
this stock, but not to disseminate it. Obviously there is no clear cut answer to this debate 
between accumulation and dissemination, and recent trends in European policy seem to favor 
the protection of property rights rather than a collective provision of public knowledge.28 But 
we claim that the historical features of the European continent call for an institutional 
arrangement favoring the open production of knowledge which would: 
 
1. Enable European and non European firms to compete on a par basis. No restriction 
should be put on access to key complementary assets such as essential facilities, in 
particular intangible assets: software or knowledge in general are a case in point. 
 
2. Support projects and initiatives which make these facilities less dependent from 
restriction by the intellectual property rights owners. This applies in particular to the 
                                                 
25  Rodrigues (2004). 
26  Our computation from Lancashire (2003) 
27  Further elements on this debate can be found in D. Foray (2002) chap. 7. 
28  See the discussions around software patenting which, at the time of writing, has not yet been decided after a 
strong battle between the European Parliament and the Council. In July 2005 the Parliament rejected a 
Directive Proposal on this subject. 
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so called “open source software”, such as the above mentioned Linux, which is 
gaining momentum and has already overcome the entry barrier created by critical 
mass.29 Linux represents a model and an opportunity to establish a challenger in a 
sector (operating systems) where network effects and an installed base lead to 
monopolization. It  creates a real opportunity to provide an alternative solution for 
embarked or domestic systems. 
 
3. Stimulate producer/ user interactions, the importance of which has been emphasized 
when we discussed table 4 above. This could be done both locally and through inter-
regional exchanges, but it has not always been the case. In that respect, “free software” 
naturally encourages user/ producer interactions because the openness of the source 
code is a guarantee that anybody is potentially entitled to reveal the “bugs”.30 
 
4. Offer occasions for training young people in knowledge based activities and provide 
them with opportunities to make the most of their acquired knowledge through 
servicing end users. There is a good chance that they will find customers, because 
locally there is an internal demand in many parts of Europe. 
 
Thus our vision of an industrial policy for ICT, is that the European Union and its Member 
States should encourage the production and dissemination of a specific open knowledge 
namely software for embedded and embarked operating systems. Those are the key 
components or platforms which enable connectivity between heterogeneous devices, helping 
innovators to design new and innovative services on a proprietary basis, while enabling the 
customer not to be captured by completely proprietary systems. Being accessible all across 
Europe, this knowledge capital could be further exploited and enhanced locally by service 
firms, eventually creating jobs. The key point of our argument is that focussing only on open 
interconnection platforms (or operating systems) has several advantages: 
 
 As said before, European firms are in a challenger position and this strategy is well 
suited to a challenger: an incumbent has a strong interest to protect the source of its 
competitive advantage, while a challenger has to overcome a network and critical 
mass effects that benefit its main rival (Rohlfs, 2001). This can be done essentially by 
making the source of this advantage shared with others in order to induce customers to 
move to a more competitive community of suppliers. 
 
 From a public policy point of view, there are also two strong arguments: first, open 
knowledge will stimulate knowledge creation because many potential innovators will 
be able to exercise their talent from a common basis. Said in the words of section I, 
Schumpeter Mark I is, generally speaking, supposed to be more effective, and 
encouraging open knowledge leads to Schumpeter Mark I: with a knowledge base 
similar across suppliers, each of them will be closely competitor with its neighbors. 
                                                 
29  See for example Varian and Shapiro (2003) 
30 ibid. 
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Hence it will have to construct its own competitive advantage with different things, 
such as talent or complementary assets. In any case the “playing field” will be “level”. 
 
 The second argument stems from the fact that an essential facility, a key 
interconnection platform, will be available without any restriction. Building upon the 
fact emphasized by Varian and Shapiro, that some open source software such as Linux 
has already reached a critical mass, this may dampen the switching costs of users. 
Focussing for example on implementation of an open source platform in embarked 
systems or in domestic networks, would bring quick returns to the European firms. 
The market should thus develop easily if the corresponding products and services are 
adequate. 
 
What then could be the contours of this industrial policy for ICT? 
 
 First, guarantee that any software or program written with the European support in the 
framework of an “open source policy” is not protected by any property right. 
Instruments like the General Purpose License or any similar “copyleft” framework 
could be used for that purpose.  
 
 Second, rely on the instruments already available in the present institutional 
arrangement. There is, at the Union’s level, the Framework Research Program, the 
Eureka initiatives which provide possibilities for joint public/ private partnerships and 
could help designers to write open source software for embarked operating systems. 
Specific actions in direction of small and medium enterprises could also enable them 
to serve customers on the basis of the “open” software freely available. 
 
 Third, diffuse open source software in the e-government initiatives linked with the 
“eEurope” program.  
 
 Fourth, encourage professors to teach, students to study and share open source 
software on a broad scale. 
 
 Fifth, establish or support a certification body at the European level which could 
guarantee the quality of the software produced.  
 
 Sixth, invite specialty software producers and users to focus on applications that could 
be standardized in an open source framework. Consumer electronics and pervasive 
computing should represent an important target for such policy, for the reasons 
mentioned before: they are probably the future dominant sub-sectors in the decade to 
come. But whatever the market segment, the key point is to ensure that such software 
creates a critical mass of users that enables the market to develop freely. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have analyzed the trend of the ICT industry and proposed a scenario to 
overcome the difficulties of Europe. The policy suggested may represent a big gamble for the 
Union. But we think that it might be preferable to a long decline, accompanied by tensions 
among member countries with different perceptions of their competitiveness in the ICT 
sector. 
 
Further discussions may emerge around the effective implementation of the policy we 
recommend. Close cooperation between the Commission and member states may be 
necessary to stimulate the development of open source in specific segments, while promoting 
at the same moment competition in other segments. We had no room to tackle this issue. 
However, we hope that our contribution may lead to further research. In particular, we would 
like to examine in  more detail the future transformation of a sector, sketchily depicted here 
with large brushstrokes.  
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